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Disarming the Ultimate Historical 
Challenge to Scientific Realism 
(forthcoming in The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science) 
Peter Vickers 
 
Abstract 
 
Probably the most dramatic historical challenge to scientific realism concerns Arnold 
Sommerfeld’s 1916 derivation of the fine structure energy levels of hydrogen. Not 
only were his predictions good, he derived exactly the same formula that would later 
drop out of Dirac’s 1928 treatment (something not possible using 1925 Schrödinger–
Heisenberg quantum mechanics). And yet the most central elements of 
Sommerfeld’s theory were not even approximately true: his derivation leans heavily 
on a classical approach to elliptical orbits, including the necessary adjustments to 
these orbits demanded by relativity. Even physicists call Sommerfeld’s success a 
‘miracle’, which rather makes a joke of the so-called ‘no miracles argument’. 
However, this can all be turned around. Here I argue that the realist has a story to 
tell vis-à-vis the discontinuities between the old and the new theory, leading to a 
realist defence based on sufficient continuity of relevant structure. 
1. Introduction 
2. No Realist Commitment Required? 
3. Enter the Physicists 
4. A New Approach to the Non-Relativistic Success 
5. Relativity and Spin 
6. Structure and Realist Commitment 
7. Conclusion 
 
1 Introduction 
The historical challenge to scientific realism widely considered the most serious and 
problematic concerns Arnold Sommerfeld’s 1916 derivation of the fine structure spectral 
lines of hydrogen.1 What makes the case so powerful against realism is how it apparently 
overcomes the usual realist defences. For example, when it comes to the success-to-truth 
inference at the core of scientific realism, modern realists set a high bar for the level of 
success required. Novel predictive success has long been favoured over ‘mere’ explanatory 
success, but more recently it has become clear that even novel predictive success should 
not be motivating if the predictions are vague or otherwise unimpressive (despite their 
novelty). In addition most contemporary realists insist that such success only justifies a 
realist commitment to the ‘success-fuelling’ or ‘working’ parts of the theory in question; the 
wider theory might well be radically false, without any threat to realism. But these popular 
defences do not seem remotely helpful when it comes to the Sommerfeld case. 
Sommerfeld’s ‘fine structure formula’ was perfect, since it is exactly the same formula that 
later resulted from the relativistic Dirac quantum mechanics (QM) of 1928 (itself an 
improvement on Schrödinger–Heisenberg QM). And at the very heart of Sommerfeld’s 
theory are continuous worldline elliptical orbits of electrons, derived using relativistic 
classical mechanics. Sommerfeld assumed that the mass of the electron changes as its 
velocity changes during its orbit, in line with relativity. But as Griffiths ([2004], p. 16) notes 
in his popular textbook: ‘It’s not even clear what velocity means in QM’ (original emphasis). 
 Many figures in the contemporary realism debate do not like to talk in terms of 
counterexamples to realism. Instead realism is said to involve a defeasible commitment: 
scientific success is (highly) indicative of truth, but does not guarantee it. But this overlooks 
the fact that the measure of scientific success, including predictive success, is a matter of 
degree (cf. Fahrbach [2011]). The more impressive the success, the closer the realist comes 
to inferring that that success must be born of truth. Thus one can see why some have been 
tempted to refer to the Sommerfeld case as a ‘counterexample’, at least loosely speaking: 
the quantitative accuracy of Sommerfeld’s fine structure formula is extremely impressive, 
and thus highly motivating for the realist. Thus it seems especially hard in this case for the 
realist to shrug her shoulders and say ‘Well, this is just one case, and my inference is 
defeasible.’ 
 Despite the apparent measure of the success, certain anomalies provide a possible 
reason for the realist to evade making a commitment in this case. This is explored in Section 
2, but I argue that, all things taken into consideration, the realist must make a commitment. 
Even if the realist could find a way to avoid making a commitment, there remains the 
mystery of why Sommerfeld’s radically false theory led to the ‘perfect’ formula. In the 
physics literature the case is known as ‘The Sommerfeld puzzle’, and two physicists in 
particular have attempted to solve the puzzle, whilst several others have commented on it. 
The physics literature is of crucial significance for the philosophical debate, and I turn to it in 
Section 3. I then build up to an explanation of Sommerfeld’s success which also stands as a 
                                                          
1 For example, at the conference The History of Science and Contemporary Scientific Realism, held in 
Indianapolis 19–21 February 2016, this case came up repeatedly during both formal and informal discussion, 
as a case apparently impossible to reconcile with the realist’s success-to-truth inference. 
realist defence. In Section 4 I start by turning to the non-relativistic case, and the predictive 
success of old quantum theory vis-à-vis the spectral lines of ionised helium. I offer a new 
approach to this case which then stands as a platform from which to approach the 
relativistic case and the fine structure formula in Section 5. Section 6 tackles some 
outstanding questions concerning the structural relationship between the old and the new 
theory; Section 7 is the conclusion. 
 
2 No Realist Commitment Required? 
In (Sommerfeld [1916])—building on Bohr’s 1913 model of the hydrogen atom—
Sommerfeld derived the fine structure formula for the allowed energy states of 
unperturbed hydrogen, and thus via ΔE=hv the possible frequencies of the hydrogen 
spectral lines (for Z=1)2: 
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Prima facie this result ticks all the boxes the realist requires to make a doxastic 
commitment. The formula (combined with ΔE=hv) encodes countless novel predictions of 
spectral lines with extreme quantitative accuracy. It even applies to different elements (not 
only hydrogen), so long as the atoms are ionised such that they are one-electron atoms. In 
particular, the formula applies to the ionised helium fine structure (Z=2). 
 However, the realist might offer two separate reasons that a realist commitment to 
(even parts of) Sommerfeld’s 1916 theory was in fact not warranted: (i) the scientific 
landscape was changing rapidly at that time (1916–25), and perhaps a cautious realist 
should not make a realist commitment to any theory, however successful, until a few years 
have passed and the dust has settled (cf. Harker [2013], fn. 24); (ii) although Sommerfeld’s 
success vis-à-vis the fine structure formula was widely perceived as excellent, the theory 
also encountered some anomalies, and a realist inclined towards credence updating might 
insist that after iterating one’s degree of belief in the theory given all available evidence, 
including anomalies/disconfirmations, one’s final degree of belief might not be very high. 
Concerning reason (i), it does seem reasonable that a cautious realist will hold back from 
making a commitment whenever the relevant science is in serious flux. There is of course 
the question of how long the realist should hold back. The appropriate length of time surely 
depends on the extent of the scientific turmoil, and the measure of the relevant success 
that is calling for a realist commitment. Here we meet with a new version of Kyle Stanford’s 
                                                          
2 In this equation m0 is the rest mass of the electron, c is the speed of light, α is the fine structure constant 
equal to e2/ħc, nr and nφ are the radial and angular quantum numbers, and Z is the proton number. By 
‘unperturbed’ here and elsewhere I mean ‘not affected by electric or magnetic fields’. 
‘threshold problem’ (Stanford [2009], p. 384). Stanford’s worry was that realists can just 
keep raising the bar for what counts as sufficient success, so as to insulate realism from 
problematic historical challenges. The new version of this worry pertains to how long the 
realist waits, following significant success, before she makes a commitment. 
To dodge the Sommerfeld challenge in this way the realist would need to insist that it 
was prudent to wait at least ten years following Sommerfeld’s 1916 success before making a 
realist commitment. But can that be justified by the measure of the scientific flux during 
that period? Here a sharp distinction needs to be made between Sommerfeld’s theory as a 
theory of one-electron atoms (especially those unperturbed by magnetic fields), and 
Sommerfeld’s theory as a theory of atoms generally. Construed as a theory of atoms 
generally, there was indeed significant theoretical flux between 1916 and 1925: the wider 
research programme known as ‘old quantum theory’ (OQT) struggled with relevant 
phenomena for neutral helium and all heavier elements, and this led to all sorts of different 
theoretical suggestions in an effort to achieve empirical adequacy.3 And even when we 
focus only on one-electron atoms (especially hydrogen), there were problems accounting 
for magnetic field effects on the spectral lines (the Zeeman effects, including the Paschen–
Back effect4). But construed as a theory of one-electron atoms unperturbed by magnetic 
fields, the theoretical flux was much more limited. And for current purposes the relevant 
conceptualisation of ‘the theory’ is the narrow one which ignores heavier elements and 
magnetic fields, because Sommerfeld’s 1916 fine structure success related specifically to 
unperturbed one electron atoms. 
At this point reasons (i) and (ii), above, cannot be separated: the measure of theoretical 
flux goes hand in hand with the measure of empirical adequacy (weighing up successes and 
anomalies). The realist surely has a good argument (on both counts) when it comes to OQT 
as a theory of atoms generally: there was a significant lack of empirical adequacy and 
corresponding theoretical flux as scientists attempted to achieve empirical adequacy. But 
construed as a theory of one-electron atoms unperturbed by magnetic fields the realist’s 
case is much weaker. The measure of the empirical success vis-à-vis the hydrogen atom 
meant that there was relative theoretical stability. Anomalies cropping up for heavier 
elements could easily be put down to additional assumptions required to handle such 
elements, especially assumptions concerning how the multiple electrons in the atoms of 
heavier elements interact with each other. 
The realist can reply by pointing out that there were in fact some anomalies—with 
corresponding theoretical flux—even concerning Sommerfeld’s theory of the unperturbed 
hydrogen atom. On this point the literature is actually quite misleading, often stating (or 
suggesting) that Sommerfeld’s theory was ‘in full agreement with observation’ (Jammer 
                                                          
3 See for example Part 2 of (Mehra and Rechenberg [1982]). 
4 On the status of the Paschen–Back effect during the relevant period, see for example (Kragh [1985], pp. 102-
6). By constrast the Stark effect was considered a great success of OQT (see for example Duncan and Janssen 
[2014]). 
[1966], p. 92).5 Certainly Sommerfeld derived the ‘perfect’ fine structure formula (1) which 
was later to emerge from 1928 Dirac QM, but this formula only gives the allowed energies 
of the hydrogen atom, and doesn’t by itself deliver empirical results. The allowed energies 
only transfer into testable predictions once one adds two further ingredients: (i) the formula 
connecting energy differences with spectral line frequencies, ΔE=hv, and (ii) a statement 
concerning which energy transitions (electron jumps) will actually occur. Now, there was no 
flux concerning (i), but (ii) was a matter of significant controversy during the period 1916–
1926. If the default assumption is that all such transitions will occur—what Kragh ([1985], p. 
79) calls the ‘primitive theory’—then the predictions definitely are not empirically adequate 
(Kragh [1985], p. 71). 
In an effort to achieve empirical adequacy, scientists introduced ‘intensity rules’ for the 
expected intensity of the lines which do occur, with ‘selection rules’ as special cases where 
sometimes the intensity is zero because the transition in question never occurs. Kragh 
([1985]) identifies six different versions of Sommerfeld’s theory which were considered 
between 1916 and 1926, all differing only according to the intensity/selection rules in play.6 
Every version of Sommerfeld’s theory gives different empirical results for the spectral lines 
and each was imperfect in one way or another. Thus we do in fact find theoretical flux on 
the precise issue in question during the precise period in question, and in addition the 
success of the theory is something less than is often claimed. During the period in question 
the match between theory and experiment—even concerning hydrogen and other one-
electron atoms—could never be called ‘perfect’, and in practice anomalies were either 
ignored (Kragh [1985], p. 80 and p. 103) or explained away (p. 105). 
The anomalies in question no doubt cast a question mark over the theory. But then 
again, a doxastic commitment is often thought to be warranted in the face of (‘normal’) 
anomalies so long as the successes are good enough. And mainstream scientists of the day 
did think the successes were good enough. Kragh ([1985]) writes that mainstream physicists 
‘were completely satisfied with Sommerfeld’s theory of the hydrogen spectrum’ (p. 102), 
concluding that ‘Sommerfeld, Bohr, and their disciples decided that Paschen's confirmation 
of the theory was so decisive that no counter-evidence could qualify as serious anomalies.’ 
(p. 84). Thus, ‘Despite the anomalies that turned up in the theory of the hydrogen spectrum, 
mainstream physicists continued to believe in the complete truth of Sommerfeld’s 
explanation.’ (p. 117).7 Even in February 1925, despite all the problems which were 
emerging for the old quantum theory, Heisenberg wrote ‘the hydrogen atom is in good 
shape.’ (ibid.). 
                                                          
5 Cf. Keppeler ([2003a], p. 42), ‘The success was overwhelming…’, and Granovski ([2004], p. 524), 
‘[Sommerfeld’s theory] somehow turned out to be equivalent to the consistent Dirac theory.’ 
6 Five of these theories are listed on p. 74 of Kragh ([1985]); the sixth is the ‘primitive theory’. 
7 For a striking example of this attitude from one such disciple considering the Paschen–Back anomaly in 1924, 
see (Kragh [1985], p. 106): ‘Once again Paschen’s measurements had made Sommerfeld’s theory immune to 
criticism.’ 
If we take seriously the idea that every scientific theory ever put forward will have some 
anomalies—that anomalies are indeed ‘normal’—then the realist cannot seriously insist that 
a realist commitment will only be warranted when there are no anomalies. So can the realist 
argue that the anomalies here were significant enough to undermine the success? This is a 
very shaky line of defence for the realist given that there was a consensus amongst 
mainstream physicists of the day that the successes of the theory (construed narrowly as a 
theory of unperturbed one-electron atoms) totally overwhelmed the anomalies. The 
modern realist cannot really immerse herself in the history to such an extent that her view 
on the relationship between theory and evidence should be preferred over the view of the 
scientific community living through that period. Especially since the realist clearly has an 
agenda, and of course the realist knows that the theory ultimately failed, both of which are 
very likely to bias one’s perspective. 
Thus I suggest that it isn’t reasonable for the realist to claim that no realist commitment 
was demanded by Sommerfeld’s 1916 derivation of the fine structure formula. Yes, there 
were anomalies, but not of sufficient significance to worry mainstream physicists. And yes, 
there was some theoretical flux—even for the theory of the unperturbed hydrogen atom—
concerning the ‘selection rules’ for energy transitions. But there was also very significant 
theoretical stability (when it comes to the hydrogen atom) between 1916 and 1925. 
Thus the realist needs to accept that a realist commitment is warranted by this case, and 
turn her attention to what kind of realist commitment (if any) is compatible with the radical 
shift in thinking which occurred between 1916 (Sommerfeld) and 1928 (Dirac). In this 
project she doesn’t need to start from scratch: the physics community has long been 
interested in the question of how to explain Sommerfeld’s success.8 
 
3 Enter the Physicists 
In the physics literature this case is known as ‘The Sommerfeld puzzle’. By far the most 
common opinion coming from the physicists is that Sommerfeld’s success was a ‘fluke’, a 
‘coincidence’, and a ‘lucky accident’. For example, Ralph Kronig ([1960], p. 9) describes it as 
‘perhaps the most remarkable numerical coincidence in the history of physics.’ This take on 
the puzzle suggests the realist shouldn’t hope to find an explanation in terms of the truth 
content of Sommerfeld’s theory: instead we are encouraged to accept that Sommerfeld was 
just (incredibly) lucky. Curiously, physicists have often described this case as a ‘miracle’, and 
                                                          
8 What of philosophical literature on this puzzle? Here there is very little of any significance or substance. One 
paper which looks initially promising is (Hettema and Kuipers [1995]). But on closer inspection this paper is 
asking a very different question, concerning the relationships between the theories of Rutherford, Bohr, and 
Sommerfeld. Only in a footnote at the very end of their Conclusion (p. 295, fn. 13) do the authors speculate 
concerning the question of ‘how to compare the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ quantum theory’.  
even as a ‘cosmic joke’, directly contradicting (unintentionally!) the ‘no miracles’ or ‘no 
cosmic coincidences’ argument for scientific realism.9 
 However, dismissing it as a lucky accident doesn’t really explain how Sommerfeld’s 1916 
assumptions could lead to the same predictions. Several physicists have tried to provide 
more by way of explanation. Most popular here is a ‘two errors cancelling out’ explanation. 
Yourgrau and Mandelstam ([1968])—possibly influenced by (Schiller [1962], p. 1108)—have 
been influential, concluding their discussion with, ‘Sommerfeld's explanation was successful 
because the neglect of wave mechanics and the neglect of spin by chance cancel each other 
in the case of the hydrogen atom.’ (p. 115). Other physicists expressing similar thoughts 
include Eisberg and Resnick ([1985], p. 286), and Keppeler ([2004], p. 49). And indeed, one 
might think this is the only possible explanation. Certainly Sommerfeld was working with 
classical mechanics, as opposed to the wave mechanics of the modern quantum theory. And 
in addition it is clear that Sommerfeld did not include anything like ‘spin’ in his theory. If two 
crucial ingredients were missing, but the exact correct result was nevertheless achieved, 
then isn’t it clear that these two things exactly cancel each other, at least when it comes to 
the hydrogen atom? 
 Another option is that these two things are completely idle when it comes to the fine 
structure. This would be much better for a realist explanation, since she could then hope to 
explain Sommerfeld’s success by noting that he left out things that are irrelevant vis-à-vis 
the final result, and this is perhaps consistent with the conclusion that Sommerfeld’s theory 
includes sufficient truth to reach the correct predictions. However, this seems hopeless 
when one notes that everywhere in the physics literature the very cause of the fine 
structure is said to be the spin; to give just one example: ‘The interaction between the spin 
and the electron’s orbit is called spin-orbit interaction, which contributes energy and causes 
the fine-structure splitting.’ (Letokhov and Johansson [2009], p. 37). But if the spin is the 
cause, then it definitely makes a difference, and is not idle. Thus we seem surely led to the 
conclusion that the only way Sommerfeld could have been successful is if his neglect of spin 
and his use of the wrong mechanics cancel each other out exactly. Such a ‘freak of nature’ 
coincidence (Keppeler [2003a], p. 68) certainly does not seem conducive to scientific 
realism! 
 Some hope for the realist remains here, however, since the above discussion brushes 
over a couple of things. Talk of ‘two errors cancelling’ suggests that the errors are 
independent of each other, with one contributing a certain quantifiable error and the other 
                                                          
9 For some nice quotes to this effect (in addition to Kronig) see (Rozental [1967], p. 73 – quotation from the 
correspondence of Carl Oseen; Heisenberg [1968], p. 534; Biedenharn [1983], p. 14 – also including a 
quotation from Schrödinger, 1956; Eisberg and Resnick [1985], p. 286; Brown et al. [1995], p. 92; Keppeler 
[2003a], p. 68f., [2003b], p. 86; Granovski [2004], p. 524). See also Kragh ([1985]) and Eckert ([2013], p. 426ff.). 
Sommerfeld himself apparently didn’t see a ‘lucky coincidence’ here, instead emphasising (in 1940 and in 
1942) that both theories make essential use of special relativity (see Kragh [1985], p. 124ff. and Eckert [2013], 
p. 427). But as Eckert (ibid.) rightly notes, the common use of special relativity in the two theories ‘was no 
explanation.’ 
taking that error away. That is misleading, since in Dirac QM the spin is intimately related to 
the relativistic wave mechanics, and does not have to be introduced as a separate 
assumption at all: one can’t possibly consider what difference the spin makes to Dirac QM, 
since one can’t do Dirac QM without the spin operator.10 In addition, a structural realist 
might wonder whether there is some deep structural correspondence between the two 
theories, and this might be established in a purely formal way, with no discussion of ‘spin’ 
required. Certainly some physicists have been inclined in this direction. Heisenberg was 
curious about this puzzle, and wrote ‘It would be a stimulating project to explore whether 
this is truly a miracle, or whether perhaps the group-theoretical structure of the problem 
underlying the formulations of both Sommerfeld and Dirac itself leads already to this 
formula.’ ([1968], p. 534). Unfortunately Heisenberg never took up this ‘stimulating project’. 
But in 1982-3 Lawrence Biedenharn did. 
 Biedenharn ([1983]) at first appears to do everything the structural realist would wish. 
He claims to ‘resolve’ the puzzle, and he does this in terms of an ‘underlying symmetry of 
the problem’ (p. 14). He asserts that ‘Sommerfeld’s success is not at all a matter of blind 
luck’ (p. 14), and indeed claims to demonstrate that ‘the argument of Mandelstam and 
Yourgrau (that Sommerfeld succeeded “because the neglect of wave mechanics and the 
neglect of spin effects by chance cancel each other”) cannot possibly be correct.’ (p. 30). He 
reaches this conclusion by arguing that ‘wave mechanics per se makes no change in the 
answer’ (ibid., original emphasis). And if the wave mechanics is idle vis-à-vis the final 
predictions, then it can’t introduce an error which cancels out the error due to neglecting 
the spin. 
 However, when we look harder at (Biedenharn [1983]) things appear to go wrong for the 
realist. First of all, Biedenharn’s argument that wave mechanics per se makes no change to 
the answer is based on comparing non-relativistic old quantum theory with non-relativistic 
Schrödinger-Heisenberg QM. That is to say, Biedenharn shows that one gets the same Bohr 
energies for the allowed states of the electron whether you make use of classical mechanics 
or whether you make use of wave mechanics. But does this result obviously carry across to 
the relativistic case, comparing Sommerfeld with Dirac? The comparison simply can’t be 
done, since (as noted above) in Dirac QM spin and relativity are intimately intertwined, such 
that it is impossible to consider Dirac QM without spin and check to see whether the fine 
structure formula still results. And one might have principled reasons for doubting that the 
non-relativistic result carries across to the relativistic case. In particular, the underlying Ο(4) 
structural symmetry of the hydrogen problem is lost when one turns to the relativistic case. 
                                                          
10 The Dirac derivation begins with the Hamiltonian 
r
Ze
cmpcH
2
2
031   , where σ is the spin 
operator, and ρ1 and ρ3 are 4x4 matrices. One then solves the eigenvalue problem Hψ=Eψ, where ψ is a four 
component spinor. See for example (Biedenharn [1983], p. 25ff.). 
 There is also a basic anti-realist objection to Biedenharn’s analysis, construed as a 
defence of selective realism. The objection is simply that for selective realism to work here 
we’d need to see appropriate continuity of ‘working parts’ despite the radical differences 
between the two theories. Since continuous worldline elliptical orbits are not even 
approximately involved in Dirac QM, and since spin is not even approximately involved in 
Sommerfeld’s theory, the selective realist needs to show two things: 
(i) that Sommerfeld’s derivation can succeed without any explicit mention of, and 
without implicit reliance upon, electron orbits, and, 
(ii) that spin is not essential to the modern derivation (or that it is somehow hiding 
in Sommerfeld’s 1916 assumptions). 
But in Biedenharn’s analysis there appears to be no attempt to do either of these things: his 
Sommerfeld derivation is full of references to orbits, and his Dirac derivation is full of 
references to spin. He even states at one point ‘The spin is of course an essential ingredient 
in the relativistic quantal calculation.’ (p. 15). 
 One may wonder at this point whether, in his capacity as a theoretical physicist, 
Biedenharn just has a completely different agenda to that of the philosopher. Certain 
passages in his paper suggest an agenda very closely related (at least) to that of the 
scientific realist, but in the end there are difficulties which seem to close the door on a 
realist who would wish to simply present the paper as a selective realist defence. And the 
realist philosopher has quickly run out of physicist allies, since no other physicist has tried to 
‘resolve’ the puzzle in the sort of way Biedenharn does. 
 With the realist on the ropes the anti-realist might now introduce what would appear to 
be the killer blow. Keppeler ([2003a], [2003b], [2004]), does not merely advocate a 
coincidental ‘cancelling out’ explanation, as some physicists do; he apparently demonstrates 
it. In (Keppeler [2003a], [2003b]) he shows that Sommerfeld’s quantum conditions are 
missing a ½ ‘Maslov’ term, and he compares this with the influence of spin. After some 
lengthy calculations he concludes ‘in this particular situation the contribution deriving from 
the Maslov index and the influence of spin accidentally cancel each other.’ ([2003b], p. 86). 
Thus it seems a ‘coincidental cancelling out’ explanation must be accepted, and it’s the end 
of the road for a realist explanation. Or is it? 
 
4 A New Approach to the Non-Relativistic Success 
My realist defence begins with a new approach to explaining the non-relativistic success of 
OQT which emerged in the years 1913-15. Other papers (Vickers [2012]; Ghins [2014]) have 
offered selective realist defences specifically against Bohr’s 1913 (non-relativistic) model of 
the atom construed as an example of significant empirical success issuing from (radically) 
false hypotheses. But these defences are unhelpful when it comes to the Sommerfeld 
challenge. In this Section I briefly explain why they are unhelpful, before moving on to 
consider a new theoretical approach to the hydrogen atom which had emerged by 1915, 
and which in itself presents a new (non-relativistic) challenge to the realist. I then provide a 
realist defence against the 1915 challenge which, by its nature, also stands as a clear 
springboard for tackling Sommerfeld’s 1916 relativistic extension, and the fine structure 
success. 
Vickers ([2012]) considers both Bohr’s 1913 success and Sommerfeld’s 1916 success in 
the context of the scientific realism debate. The take-home message is that there is a way to 
explain Bohr’s success in terms of truth using the selective realist strategy, but that ‘this 
strategy almost certainly can’t work for Sommerfeld’s derivation’ (p. 3). One may ask why it 
can’t work for Sommerfeld’s derivation, given that Sommerfeld’s theory is just a de-
idealization of Bohr’s theory. There is a clear answer to this question: the application of the 
selective realist strategy to Bohr’s successful prediction of the spectral lines of ionized 
helium found in (Vickers [2012]) makes essential use of the Balmer formula. This is a purely 
phenomenological formula for the ‘gross structure’ spectral lines of hydrogen, which Bohr 
made use of in a lecture at the end of 1913 in order to derive a theoretical formula for the 
Rydberg constant. This can then be used to predict the ‘gross structure’ spectral lines of 
ionized helium. Vickers ([2012])—drawing on (Norton [2000])—argues that the Balmer 
formula, combined with a subset of Bohr’s theoretical commitments which are all true (or 
very approximately true) in light of modern QM, leads to his true predictions (p. 8ff.). 
However, there is absolutely nothing like the Balmer formula for the fine structure spectral 
lines. So there is no chance of making the same sort of argument for Sommerfeld’s 
derivation of those lines. 
 At first this seems like yet another reason to suppose that a realist explanation of 
Sommerfeld’s success will not be forthcoming: the selective realist strategy, as it has been 
applied to Bohr’s 1913 success, can’t possibly work for the Sommerfeld success. But could 
there be another, different realist approach to the non-relativistic success, which perhaps 
could carry across quite naturally to the Sommerfeld success? Well, there actually needs to 
be such a different realist approach to the non-relativistic success, because there are other 
derivations which (Vickers [2012]) does not consider. In a footnote (fn. 13) I do acknowledge 
the fact that my 2012 paper focuses on the third derivation Bohr offered in 1913. Now, that 
is reasonable as far as it goes, since the first two derivations were not particularly 
impressive or influential, and the realist can and should ignore them.11 But by 1915 it 
became possible to derive the ionised helium spectral lines from old quantum theory in a 
quite different way, without assuming the Balmer formula, and apparently putting more 
weight on electron orbits. Here we meet with a new problem for the realist, since it turns 
                                                          
11 As Arabatzis ([2006]) notes, the first two derivations of 1913 are ‘imperfect’ (p. 141) because ‘based on 
questionable foundations’ (p. 130), something that Bohr himself acknowledged. See (Heilbron and Kuhn 
[1969], p. 266ff., especially p. 270) for full details. 
out that (Vickers [2012]) has done only half a job, and the realist needs to revisit the non-
relativistic success. However, a tiny glimmer of hope for the realist also opens up at this 
point: if there can be a realist explanation for the success of the 1915 derivation, then just 
possibly this same explanation could carry across to Sommerfeld’s 1916 relativistic 
extension of the theory, and the fine structure success. 
 A crucial step in developing a derivation of Bohr’s successes which does not depend on 
assuming the Balmer formula (where the Balmer formula is instead derived) was to 
generalise Bohr’s quantum condition in such a way that the ideas of Bohr and Planck could 
be unified. This came in 1915, courtesy of Sommerfeld, Wilson, and Ishiwara (see Heilbron 
and Kuhn [1969], p. 280). The resultant ‘phase-integral’ quantum conditions—the so-called 
BWS conditions—were not developed especially to apply to circular orbits. Instead by 1915 
it was usual to employ them in a derivation which assumed elliptical orbits, and thus two 
degrees of freedom (see for example Sommerfeld [1915]): 
                                                                hndp                                                                            (2) 
                                                                hndrp rr                                                                            (3) 
thus introducing quantum numbers nφ and nr.12 With these conditions in place the stage was 
set. A convenient early reconstruction of the 1915 derivation of the Bohr energies is given in 
(Pauling and Goudsmit [1930], pp. 13-20), which I now follow quite closely using the 
abbreviation ‘P&G’. 
 The derivation of the Bohr energies (with energy E and Rydberg constant R),  
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has two central physical assumptions: (i) the Coulomb Hamiltonian of classical mechanics, 
and (ii) the BWS quantum conditions. We start with the Coulomb Hamiltonian, expressing 
the potential and kinetic energy in radial coordinates r and φ (P&G, p. 14). We then make 
some manipulations to express the Hamiltonian in terms of the momenta pr and pφ 
associated with the two degrees of freedom r and φ. The angular momentum pφ is seen to 
be a constant, so we just write it as p, and the radial momentum pr can be expressed in 
terms of p. With some further manipulations we can derive the following (p. 15), 
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12 In the special case where the orbital radius is constant, equation (2) is equivalent to Bohr’s original 
quantization of angular momentum. Equation (3) was sometimes called ‘quantization of ellipses’ or 
‘quantization of eccentricity’. 
which takes exactly the same form as the equation for an ellipse which drops out of pure 
geometry (with a the major axis and ε the eccentricity): 
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A comparison of the terms on the RHS of these two equations (5) and (6) gives us the 
following equalities (p. 16): 
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Now some cancelling gives us our first equation for the energy of a given orbit: 
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This expression for E is already of interest, since we see that the energy depends only on the 
major axis of the ellipse a. It does not depend on the eccentricity, thus helping to explain 
why Bohr’s work in terms of circular orbits was so successful (he ignored something which 
happened to be irrelevant). 
 We now bring in the BWS quantum conditions—equations (2) and (3)—thus quantizing 
the angular and radial momenta (p. 17). Since the angular momentum is a constant we 
reach:  
                                                                          np                                                                        (10) 
where nφ is our first quantum number. When it comes to quantizing the radial momentum 
things are trickier, but after a few manipulations (using the relation between p and pr) we 
reach: 
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where our first quantum number nφ features again because we introduced p during the 
manipulations (not shown) and we know that p=ħnφ. 
 We can now go back to equations (7) and (8), this time equipped with equations (10) and 
(11) which give us handy substitutions for p and (1-ε2). Some substitutions, manipulations, 
and eliminations result in the Bohr energies (equation (4)). The identity depends on 
introducing a new quantum number n=nr+nφ, which just helps to simplify things, showing 
clearly that the allowed energies only depend on one quantum number. And of course, 
plugging Z=2 into equation (4), and using ΔE=hν, quickly delivers the ionized helium spectral 
lines. Thus we have a route to Bohr’s most impressive predictive successes which makes 
essential use of classical mechanics and which does not depend on assuming the Balmer 
formula. 
 Thus robbed of the explanation in (Vickers [2012]), how can the realist explain the 
success of this derivation in terms of truth? A selective realist inference from the success to 
the approximate truth of the working parts would suggest a (potentially problematic) realist 
commitment to both classical mechanics and the BWS quantum conditions. These are the 
two central physical assumptions going into the derivation, and indeed they are prima facie 
doing essential work to fuel the derivation. But can the realist reasonably claim that they are 
approximately true? Or at least appropriately linked with the truth via a structural 
relationship? 
 Here begins my argument for a realist explanation of Sommerfeld’s fine structure 
success. It starts by noting a structural relationship between non-relativistic classical 
mechanics (as used in the P&G derivation) and the non-relativistic Schrödinger–Heisenberg 
QM which emerged in 1925. In particular, it starts by noting that there is some excess 
structure in QM which is completely idle when it comes to deriving the Bohr energies. And it 
just so happens that when one removes this excess structure one recovers something 
almost identical to one formulation of (non-relativistic) classical mechanics. 
 No doubt there are fundamental differences between the physics of classical mechanics 
and the physics of QM. But if the scientific realist may be permitted to focus the structural 
relationship between the two, things look very good for her, since there is a crucial sense in 
which the relationship is extremely intimate. As shown in (Sakurai [1985], p. 103ff.), for 
example, the time-dependent Schrödinger equation reduces to the Hamilton–Jacobi 
formulation of classical mechanics in the semiclassical limit ħ→0. Goldstein ([1980], pp. 491) 
shows this clearly by presenting the following version of the Schrödinger equation, 
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which reduces to the Hamilton–Jacobi equation if the RHS equals zero, interpreting S as 
Hamilton’s principal function. And the RHS does equal zero when we take the semiclassical 
limit ħ→0. 
 Of course semiclassical QM and classical mechanics, despite sharing an equation, are not 
the same thing. In particular, in the Hamilton–Jacobi formulation of classical mechanics, 
although the motion of a particle is represented mathematically as a wave, the wave 
mechanics involved is to be interpreted purely as a representational device, without 
physical significance. In semiclassical QM we have a different perspective, which invites 
boundary conditions which dictate how the quantum numbers are introduced. This leads to 
quantum conditions which differ from the BWS conditions (equations (2) and (3)), since they 
include a ½ ‘Maslov’ term as follows:13 
                                                       hndp 2/1                                                                      (13) 
                                                       hndrp rr 2/1                                                                     (14) 
Now we ask the question whether one recovers the same Bohr energies (equation (4)) with 
a semiclassical approach, and the answer is ‘yes’ (see for example Schiller [1962], pp. 1105-
6). 
 Is this good news for the scientific realist? Not yet, since there are different possible 
interpretations of what we’ve just seen. One option is a ‘coincidental cancelling out’ 
explanation even for this non-relativistic success: the P&G derivation makes use of the 
wrong mechanics, and the wrong quantum conditions, but it delivers the correct result 
anyway. So quite naturally one might think that since there are two mistakes, but the end 
result is not affected, there must be a lucky cancelling out of the errors. If this were right the 
success of the 1915 derivation would have to be put down to luck, not to truth. 
 We can test this ‘cancelling out’ explanation directly. If there is a cancelling out of two 
errors, then each error can be considered separately, and we should be able to derive the 
actual term which is introduced by one error and cancelled out by the other. When it comes 
to the quantum conditions, we can re-run the P&G derivation given above, but use the 
quantum conditions with the Maslov term (equations (13) and (14)) instead of the BWS 
quantum conditions (equations (2) and (3)). But in fact doing this makes no difference 
whatsoever to the final result! No error term affects the final result when we use the 
alternative quantum conditions in the P&G derivation. All we have to do is make a different 
substitution n=nr+nφ+1 in the final stages of the derivation (instead of n=nr+nφ), exactly as 
seen in (Schiller [1962], p. 1106). This doesn’t change the allowed energies; it just tidies 
things up. 
 Now if the mistake with the quantum conditions is a mistake that doesn’t make a 
difference vis-à-vis the resultant energies, then it can hardly play a role in cancelling out 
some other mistake. Thus the use of classical mechanics, as opposed to quantum 
mechanics, can’t make any difference either. And that is confirmed by the fact that, as seen 
above, when one takes the ħ→0 limit of QM one (a) recovers the Hamilton–Jacobi equation, 
and (b) ends up with exactly the same Bohr energies; the term on the RHS of equation (12) 
is idle structure vis-à-vis deriving the Bohr energies. 
 So we avoid a ‘cancelling out’ explanation of the non-relativistic success. But are we left 
with a realist explanation? The explanation we have reached includes two factors: (i) the 
                                                          
13 Useful sources are (Sakurai [1985], p. 107; Keppeler [2003b], p. 105; Müller-Kirsten [2012], p. 297, equation 
14.63b). 
P&G derivation misses out some structure (the RHS of equation (12)) which is idle vis-à-vis 
the result, and (ii) the P&G derivation makes use of a quantum condition which is just one 
option for reaching the result. On (i), many realists will be satisfied, since the ħ→0 
relationship between classical and quantum mechanics is reminiscent of many 
predecessor/successor theory relationships in the history of physics. The careful realist 
would never be so naïve as to suppose that, in a case of predictive success, there couldn’t 
possibly be some further unidentified structure which just doesn’t make a difference for the 
prediction(s) in question. Such caution from the realist is especially warranted when there 
are phenomena closely related to those successfully predicted which can’t be similarly 
accommodated by the theory. And this was exactly the situation during the years of the old 
quantum theory (spectral line intensities and the neutral helium problem, for example). 
 Turning to (ii), the realist can treat this in the same way, describing the ½ Maslov term in 
the semiclassical quantum conditions as ‘idle structure’: a theoretical difference that 
doesn’t make an empirical difference vis-à-vis the Bohr energies. The realist might also point 
out that when it comes to the ½ Maslov term it was really quite easy to notice, in the 
context of the 1915 derivation, that such a term wouldn’t make a difference to the final 
spectral line predictions. And whenever the realist recognises that, at some step in a 
derivation, two different assumptions lead to the same conclusion, she has a principled 
reason to remain somewhat agnostic between those two assumptions (cf. Psillos [1999], p. 
110). Of course, Sommerfeld and others had prior reasons for preferring the BWS quantum 
conditions (see Jammer [1966], p. 90ff.). But those other reasons must be divorced from the 
confirmation accrued to the conditions by the success. The confirmation accrued to the 
conditions by the success cannot be overly significant when there is another formula 
available which would work just as well. In the context of the realism debate, that means 
that one’s degree of belief in those conditions should not increase dramatically as a direct 
result of the predictive success. Instead, the realist might sensibly opt to stay rather neutral 
between the two options. 
 With the ‘cancelling out’ explanation left behind, and with due care taken over the 
nature of the realist commitment warranted by the success, the realist has a story to tell vis-
à-vis the derivation of the ionised helium spectral lines by use of classical mechanics and the 
BWS quantum conditions. So far this has all concerned the non-relativistic success, but the 
time is well spent. The stage is set to tackle the Sommerfeld miracle. 
 
5 Relativity and Spin 
I’ve argued that the realist has a good story to tell concerning the success of the 1915 
derivation, a story which depends on appropriately relating the P&G assumptions to the 
assumptions at the heart of non-relativistic QM. If this is accepted, the realist has a natural 
way to extend the story to include the fine structure success. In both the old and the new 
theory the fine structure formula follows if we make the necessary relativistic adjustments 
to the assumptions in play. The underlying nature of the structural relationship relied upon 
by the realist in the non-relativistic case will be preserved, since the structural adjustments 
required by relativity will affect both the old and the new theory in the same fundamental 
sense. 
 This is the short story. We can confirm that it is a good story in a number of different 
ways. For one thing, we might wonder about the identification of ‘idle structure’ in non-
relativistic QM which crucially featured in the story told in the previous Section. Can we 
identify ‘idle structure’ in exactly the same sort of way in the relativistic setting? With Dirac 
QM the theory has changed quite significantly, since now the relevant equation involves a 
four-component spinor, 4x4 matrices, and a spin operator (see footnote 10). If the structural 
relationship between classical and quantum mechanics noted in the previous section really 
is preserved in the relativistic setting, then we should expect there to be idle structure also 
within Dirac QM, and we should expect a semiclassical treatment of Dirac QM to still deliver 
the fine structure formula. And indeed, this is exactly what we do find; Keppeler ([2003a]) 
demonstrates that the fine structure formula (equation (1)) still exactly follows when we 
take away from Dirac QM certain mathematical structure via the action of taking the 
semiclassical limit ħ→0. Thus—when it comes to the specific issue of deriving the fine 
structure formula—there is excess structure in Dirac QM which is fully analogous to the 
excess structure we identified in the non-relativistic case. 
 But what about the role of spin in Dirac QM, and the fact that the fine structure is said to 
be caused by the spin-orbit interaction? If spin is an essential part of Dirac QM, how can the 
realist hope to find sufficient continuity through theory change to explain Sommerfeld’s 
success? Two things need to be noted here: (i) spin is not assumed in Dirac QM—it is not 
one of the physical assumptions one makes within Dirac QM in order to reach the fine 
structure formula, and (ii) the realist must not commit to the physical reality of ‘spin’ 
anyway, regardless of the Sommerfeld puzzle. 
 To expand on point (i): the realist’s success-to-truth inference has always been an 
inference from empirical success to the (approximate) truth of the assumptions essentially 
employed to generate that success.14 In the case of Dirac’s derivation of the fine structure 
formula (equation (1)), it is simply not the case that one must essentially assume the 
existence of spin in order to generate the result. And since Dirac did not assume the 
existence of spin, it immediately makes more sense why Sommerfeld managed to derive the 
fine structure formula without assuming the existence of anything like spin. Instead, in both 
theories, the fine structure formula follows from a relativistic adjustment of the mechanics. 
It’s just the case that in the Dirac theory the relativistic adjustment also leads to the 
                                                          
14 There are significant complexities when it comes to the nature of this inference, which needn’t be explored 
here. See (Vickers [2016]). 
introduction of a spin operator15 which in turn suggests the reality of spin as a property of 
the electron. 
 But how strongly does it ‘suggest’ the reality of spin? This question leads directly to point 
(ii): the reason the modern realist would not commit to the fundamental reality of spin is 
because it is—as far as we know—idle vis-à-vis the empirical successes of QM. What tells us 
that spin is inessential to QM is the fact that we have at least one interpretation of QM—the 
Bohmian interpretation—where spin is not a fundamental property of electrons (or anything 
else).16 Instead, apparent ‘spin behaviour’ is explained in terms of other properties and 
relations. Of course, many physicists and philosophers of physics prefer some other 
interpretation, where spin is ‘real’. But their reasons for doing so are not going to be 
motivating for the cautious selective realist, who is mainly motivated by significant empirical 
successes, especially predictions. Other interpretations have not enjoyed significant 
empirical successes that the Bohmian interpretation cannot enjoy.17 What this means, then, 
is that we should not talk about spin dropping out of Dirac QM without careful qualification 
of what we really mean by ‘spin’. Nor should we talk of spin causing the fine structure 
splitting without careful qualification. Nor should we say ‘The mathematical formalism of 
the Dirac equation and group theory require the existence of spin’ (Morrision [2004], p. 
443), and ‘spin shows itself as necessary for conservation of angular momentum’ (Morrison 
[2007], p. 546). Not if we want to stay neutral on interpretations of QM (as the careful 
realist surely must). 
 But then what should the realist be committed to, if not spin? We need to ask what is 
common to all the different interpretations of quantum mechanics. Certainly they all include 
a spin operator, but this in itself doesn’t entail that spin is a real property (cf. Daumer et al. 
[1997]). At the same time, the spin operator isn’t just mathematics: as the Morrison quote 
tells us, it has a crucial physical role for the relativistic hydrogen atom, ensuring 
conservation of angular momentum. Conservation of angular momentum is common to 
every interpretation, but that doesn’t mean that every interpretation demands the reality of 
spin as a fundamental property of the electron; there are other ways to affect the angular 
momentum, an underdetermination of the relevant physics. In a semiclassical approach to 
the Dirac equation the relevant physics concerns a classical ‘Thomas’ spin precession 
(Keppeler [2003a], p. 43). In the Sommerfeld case, when one introduces relativity, the 
angular momentum is affected by a precession not of spin, but of electron orbits. And it 
should be little surprise (absolutely not a ‘miracle’) that the effect on angular momentum 
due to spin in Dirac QM, and the effect on angular momentum due to orbital precession in 
                                                          
15 See for example (Morrison [2004], p. 439ff.; Pashby [2012], p. 443ff.). 
16 I should perhaps say that there are variants of the Bohmian interpretation where spin is not a fundamental 
property (which is enough for my purposes). For discussion see (Pagonis and Clifton [1995]; Bub [1997], 
Chapter 6; Daumer et al. [1997], especially Section 4). 
17 There are complications when it comes to making Bohmian mechanics relativistic, which are currently being 
worked out. See for example (Dürr et al. [2014]). I will assume in this paper that it is not impossible to make 
Bohmian mechanics relativistic. 
Sommerfeld’s theory, are exactly the same. There is no room for manoeuvre when it comes 
to the precession and the spin, since neither one is actually introduced, by hand, to the 
theory. Instead each is simply an inevitable consequence of making the theory relativistic.18 
 Biedenharn ([1983]) is helpful here, putting some technical meat on the bones of my 
claim that precession is to Sommerfeld’s theory what the spin is to Dirac’s theory. In his 
original derivation Sommerfeld handled the orbital precession by moving to a rotating frame 
of reference, resulting in equations which take the form of normal ‘closed’ ellipses. 
Biedenharn (p. 14) shows that ‘Sommerfeld's transformation to a special coordinate frame 
(in which the "rosette motion" is closed […]) is exactly paralleled by an analogous 
transformation in the Dirac solution.’ This transformation in the Dirac case (ibid., p. 27) acts 
to make the spin ‘disappear’ in just the same way that the precession disappears in the 
Sommerfeld case when one views the hydrogen atom from a rotating frame of reference. 
And the relationship between the two transformations is made especially clear by the fact 
that the Dirac transformation turns into Sommerfeld’s rotating frame of reference in the 
classical limit of the quantum theory (ibid., p. 28). 
 If it is accepted that Sommerfeld’s precession plays an exactly analogous role in his 
theory to the role of spin in the Dirac theory, then this bears heavily on the many 
suggestions in the literature that Sommerfeld succeeded because his error in omitting the 
spin is cancelled out by another error he made. But what about the ‘killer blow’ I introduced 
back in Section 3? Recall that Keppeler ([2003a], Section 9; [2003b], pp. 105-7) apparently 
shows that two theoretical features—relevant spin rotation angles and the ½ Maslov term—
cancel out (or add to an integer). Further he notes (as does Schiller [1962], p. 1108) that if 
we only include the ½ Maslov term (leaving out the spin) we end up with the wrong fine 
structure formula; we need to also introduce the spin to get the fine structure formula back 
on track. Doesn’t this show that they do indeed cancel each other out, and cannot both be 
described as ‘idle wheels’ vis-à-vis the fine structure formula? 
 Not necessarily. Keppeler (like Schiller) is working in a semiclassical framework. This is 
what makes it possible for him to leave out the spin, and proceed with the derivation to 
show that one then reaches the wrong fine structure formula. In the full Dirac theory it is 
impossible to treat the spin as an independent part of the theoretical framework in this 
way: it is too intimately integrated in the relevant equations.19 Keppeler’s use of 
semiclassical theory to draw conclusions about the role of spin is also questionable on the 
grounds that ‘spin’ means something different within semiclassical theory: it refers to a 
classical ‘Thomas’ spin precession. The semiclassical approach is often thought of as a 
mathematical technique for finding approximate solutions to quantum problems when an 
                                                          
18 Schrödinger tried to make QM relativistic in 1925 simply by introducing the Klein–Gordon Hamiltonian. But 
to make QM properly relativistic, and such that it is not ‘in disagreement with the general principles of 
quantum mechanics’ (Morrison [2004], p. 440) we need to adjust the Schrödinger equation in a more 
fundamental way, leading to the Dirac equation. 
19 Recall Section 3, including footnote 10. 
exact solution is unachievable. But really, it is better to think of it as a separate theory—
‘Semiclassical Mechanics’ (see for example Child [2014])—which makes various physical 
claims which contradict Dirac QM, including claims about ‘spin’. Thus, when it comes to 
‘spin’, there is a danger inherent in drawing lessons from the semiclassical framework and 
applying the conclusions to the full Dirac theory.20 
Thus I maintain that Sommerfeld’s success is down to the fact that his theory includes 
sufficient structural truth. The classical mechanics he employed does leave out something 
very important, but that missing ‘extra structure’ is totally idle when it comes to the specific 
issue of the allowed energy levels. And when it comes to the spin, at a certain level of 
abstraction Sommerfeld’s theory includes exactly what it needs to: in both theories, old and 
new, there is a certain physical feature which contributes the angular momentum required 
to ensure conservation of angular momentum. The physics is underdetermined, but that 
isn’t an issue if the realist may be permitted to focus on abstract theoretical ‘structure’. 
 
6 Structure and Realist Commitment 
How was Sommerfeld able to derive predictions of extreme quantitative accuracy with such 
a radically false physical picture of the hydrogen atom? Isn’t it a miracle? Certainly it is 
surprising, but the above discussion gives us various reasons to steer clear of the dramatic 
word ‘miracle’. For one thing, it is clear that Sommerfeld didn’t need to get the physics 
exactly right, so long as the structure of his theory took on a certain form. But more 
importantly, Sommerfeld didn’t even need to get the structure right, in two different ways. 
First, we need to make a distinction between ‘working’ and ‘idle’ structure (cf. Votsis 
[2011]). Sommerfeld used the BWS quantum conditions, but these are more specific than 
they need to be (cf. Saatsi [2005], p. 532). Sommerfeld’s derivation is just as successful with 
the more abstract conditions described by:   hmnpdq )2/1( , m=0 or m=1 (that is, 
staying neutral on BWS and semiclassical conditions). Second, Sommerfeld’s theory was 
missing some structure which is a crucial part of Dirac QM. But it turns out that the missing 
structure is idle vis-à-vis the fine structure formula, so it didn’t matter that Sommerfeld 
missed it out. 
 The sheer flexibility at the theoretical level vis-à-vis deriving the fine structure formula is 
surprising. The flexibility extends to the metaphysics, physics, and even the basic 
mathematical structure. It is definitely not the case that there is a great sensitivity of the 
final predictions to the starting assumptions. This reduces the ‘miraculousness’ of 
Sommerfeld’s success quite dramatically. One definitely should not make a comparison with 
                                                          
20 There isn’t a similar worry when it comes to comparing the BWS quantum conditions with the semiclassical 
quantum conditions (cf. the penultimate paragraph of Section 4). That step in my argument concerns sufficient 
continuity of relevant structure, and semiclassical mechanics includes the relevant structure of QM given that 
the term on the RHS of equation (12) is idle vis-à-vis the result in question. 
various other examples in physics where there is great sensitivity of final predictions to 
starting assumptions. For example, if I don’t get the position of the sun exactly right, my 
prediction of the exact duration of the next total solar eclipse in Mexico (268 seconds in 
Nazas on 8 April 2024) will not be exactly right. Such examples can be misleading, since 
sometimes there is far less sensitivity of final predictions to starting assumptions. And the 
less sensitivity there is, the less surprising it is that a false theory could lead to true 
predictions. 
 In fact, I have only just scratched the surface on the theoretical flexibility vis-à-vis 
deriving the hydrogen energy levels. Biedenharn ([1983], p. 21ff.) shows that non-relativistic 
quantum mechanics delivers the Bohr energies whether or not one includes the spin. 
Including the spin in the non-relativistic quantal treatment only affects the degeneracy (the 
number of different electron states with the same energy). This is similar to the way Bohr hit 
upon the correct energies (ignoring the fine structure for a moment) when he only made 
use of circular orbits: before we go relativistic, all orbits with the same major axis have the 
same energy (equation (9)). Thus any model of the hydrogen atom which includes at least 
one such orbit for each principle quantum number n will deliver the same allowed energies 
(equation (4)), and thus the same spectral line frequency predictions.21 
 If we take a Bayesian point of view, this all increases the value for p(E,¬T). In other 
words, there is a greater probability than you might originally have thought of getting the 
correct predictions with the wrong theory. A realist updating her credences based on 
Sommerfeld’s success should therefore make a smaller increase than initial appearances 
would suggest. However, there is only theoretical flexibility in certain respects: there are 
features of the underlying structure which absolutely must be left alone if the fine structure 
formula is to be derived. It follows that the realist needs to make different credence 
adjustments to different features of the theory, following the successful predictions. This 
doesn’t mean simply separating the ‘working’ and the ‘idle’ parts of the theory: it’s more 
complicated than that. For example, the BWS conditions definitely were not simply idle vis-
à-vis deriving the fine structure formula, but the realist’s credence in them should be 
modified by the realisation that there are other quantum conditions which will do the job 
just as well. In my view, in the face of Sommerfeld’s success, even one’s degree of belief in 
Sommerfeld’s electron orbits should increase; it is unrealistic to suggest that somebody 
living at that time could have made a clean distinction between the ‘structure’ and the 
physical electron orbits, labelling the former ‘working’ and the latter ‘idle’. But because the 
mathematical structure is so fundamental to deriving the predictions, so directly involved, 
our credence in that structure should increase far more than our credence in the orbits 
(which are more loosely connected to the final predictions). The realist should never have 
gotten caught up in a discussion of how to separate the ‘working’ from the ‘idle’, as if that 
were a black-and-white issue. In any case of scientific success, confirmation will confer upon 
different theoretical elements to different degrees. 
                                                          
21 For another example of theoretical flexibility, see (Jammer [1966], p. 93f.). 
 Some philosophers will certainly take issue with this suggested separation (even if not a 
clean separation) between our epistemic position vis-à-vis the structure and our epistemic 
position vis-à-vis the orbits. It might seem like a post-hoc distinction devised purely to 
preserve scientific realism. Kyle Stanford, in particular, has argued that it would have been 
‘unintelligible’ for scientists of the day to accept the wave nature of light but to deny the 
existence of the aether ([2006], p. 171). Similarly, I expect that Stanford would say of 
Sommerfeld’s theory that to make a realist commitment to the underlying theoretical 
structure without also making a commitment to the physical picture involved—complete 
with precessing elliptical orbits—would have been unintelligible to the scientific community 
during the period 1916–1925. However, I am inclined to think that it would not have been 
considered absurd by everyone, since some physicists (Peter Debye, for example) were 
increasingly sceptical of electron orbits. But more importantly, I here offer a prescription, 
not a description, for the epistemic commitment warranted by a scientific success. Scientists 
back in 1916 were still closely wedded to classical physics, and hadn’t sufficiently left behind 
the basic assumption that what makes sense at the macroscopic level can also apply at the 
microscopic level.22 We have now been accordingly educated, and a purely structural 
commitment when it comes to fundamental physics makes good sense given that there is 
nothing remotely intuitive about the quantum world. Further, a focus on ‘structure’ is 
already required for a realist response to the multiple different interpretations of QM. 
 As for the precise details of the structural correspondence between the two theories, I 
have discussed the close relationship between Hamilton–Jacobi classical mechanics and 
non-relativistic QM, and also the relationship between the BWS quantum conditions and the 
semiclassical quantum conditions. Part of the puzzle also concerns the close 
correspondence between orbital precession in the Sommerfeld theory and spin in the Dirac 
theory. For the reader looking for further technical details I can only refer to (Biedenharn 
[1983]), who provides the physics in all its glory, and concludes that the correspondence 
between the Sommerfeld derivation and the Dirac derivation is ‘the closest possible 
correspondence’ and ‘extends to every detail’ (p. 14).23 
 
7 Conclusion 
I have here presented some central ingredients in a realist defence against the Sommerfeld 
challenge. In some respects I have provided the essential philosophical discussion required 
                                                          
22 Bohr wrote to Carl Oseen in January 1926, that if only the match between theory and experiment had not 
been so exact, ‘then we should not have been tempted to apply mechanics as crudely as we believed possible 
for some time.’ (Kragh [1985], p. 85). 
23 Of course, I haven’t here provided a positive account of what, exactly, the cautious selective realist faced 
with Sommerfeld’s success would be committed to. But this paper is about providing a defence against an 
historical challenge, where that challenge consists in presenting an apparently radical discontinuity. So to 
defend against the challenge the realist need only show that there isn’t such a radical discontinuity after all, at 
least in certain crucial respects (see Vickers [2017]). 
to complement the impenetrable physics and murky dialectic found in (Biedenharn [1983]). 
For example, in Section 3 I argued that Biedenharn fails to show two things crucial to a 
realist response: (i) that Sommerfeld’s derivation can succeed without reliance upon orbits, 
and (ii) that spin is not essential to the Dirac derivation (or is hiding in Sommerfeld’s 
derivation). These were tackled in Sections 4 and 5, respectively: (i) was handled by drawing 
on a structural relationship between classical and quantum mechanics, and (ii) was handled 
by noting that (a) Sommerfeld’s orbital precession is to classical mechanics what spin is to 
Dirac QM, (b) spin is not an independent assumption Dirac made—it instead drops out of 
making QM relativistic, and (c) there is at least one interpretation of QM where spin is not a 
fundamental property, with the consequence that the cautious realist, who stays neutral on 
interpretations of QM, must not commit to the reality of spin anyway, regardless of the 
Sommerfeld puzzle. 
 Of course both realists and non-realists who despair of ‘structural realism’ will not be 
impressed. But if the strongest arguments against my defence are quite general arguments 
against the viability of structural realism, then that will indicate that the defence is relatively 
strong. And in addition one needn’t be a structural realist tout court in order to formulate a 
realist defence based on a structural relationship for this particular case (cf. Peters [2014]). 
This is a case of great historical and scientific complexity, and no doubt work remains to 
be done tightening up certain parts of the argument. But if this case is the ‘ultimate’ 
historical challenge to scientific realism, then it is already of major significance that the 
realist can provide a promising answer. Certainly the realist was stunned by this historical 
challenge. But the comeback is on. 
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